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THE UNITARY CRIMINAL PROCEEDING:
DENIAL OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
In American courts the criminal defendant is guaranteed the
privilege against self-incrimination.' This privilege protects him from
being compelled to give testimony against himself which will tend to
incriminate him.2 In Johnson v. Commonwealth3 an argument ad-
vanced by the defendant on appeal indicated that there is a crucial
relationship between the privilege against self-incrimination and the
use of a two-stage trial procedure. This procedure provides separate
trials on the issues of guilt and punishment in capital cases.
4 It is
based upon the theory that the jury can only reach a rational decision
on the assessment of punishment after a thorough study of the prior
criminal record and general background of the defendant which is
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, provides, in part:
[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law....
Similar provisions are found in the constitutions of nearly all the states. E.g.,
VA. CoNsT. art. i, § 8.
-Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); United States v. Gordon,
236 F.2d 916 (ad Cir. 1956). For cases dealing with state constitutional privileges
against self-incrimination, see Ex parte Blanche, 40 Cal. App. 2d 687, 105 P.2d 635
(1940); Jenkins v. State, 73 Ga. App. 515, 37 S.E.2d 230 (1946); People v. Tavenier,
384 Ill. 388, 51 N.E.2d 528 (1943); Duckworth v. District Court, 220 Iowa 1350,
264 N.W. 715 (1936); Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 8oo, 1o8 S.W.-d 1o41
('937); Commonwealth v. Frank, 159 Pa. Super. 271, 48 A.2d 1o (1946).
32o8 Va. 481, 158 S.E.2d 725 (1968).
'In the first phase of the trial the sole issue is guilt or innocence; then, if the
defendant is found guilty and the death penalty can be imposed, further proceed-
ings are held on the issue of punishment. At this second phase of the trial, evidence
is admissible concerning any circumstances surrounding the crime, the defendant's
background and past history, and any facts in mitigation or aggravation of the
crime. For a discussion of the penalty trial procedure, see Note, The California
Penalty Trial, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 386 (1964). See generally Knowlton, Jury Dis-
cretion in Capital Cases, iol U. OF PA. L. REV. 1099, 1135-36 (1953); 110 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 1036 (1962); 19 U. OF PrTr. L. REV. 670 (1958).
The split trial cures the major problem in sentencing capital cases, which is
not present in non-capital cases. In non-capital cases the function of the jury in
nearly all jurisdictions is limited to determining guilt or innocence. See Handler,
Background Evidence in Murder Cases, 51 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 317 (196o) for a
collection of these statutes. Fixing the penalty is the function of the court, which
may receive any additional information relevant to sentence. However, in capital
cases the jury must fix the penalty without the aid of additional information that
is available to the court in non-capital cases.
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unavailable in the unitary procedure.5 The two-stage procedure has
been adopted by five states and is advocated by the Model Penal
Code.
7
Johnson was convicted of first degree murder and the jury assessed
his punishment at death. Witnesses placed Johnson near the scene
of the crime and the ten year old son of the deceased, who was present
at the commission of the crime, identified the defendant. On appeal,
the defendant contended that the Virginia procedure of simultane-
ously submitting to the jury the issues of guilt and assessment of
punishment8 precludes a rational decision by the jury and burdens
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. 9 The defendant
argued that if he wanted to personally present information concern-
ing his background and character to be used by the jury in the
assessment of punishment, he would have to waive his privilege
rSee MODEL PENAL CODE § 2O.6, Comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), which
concludes that "t]here is no reason to insist upon a choice between a method
which threatens the fairness of the trial of guilt or innocence and one which de-
tracts from the rationality of the determination of the sentence. The obvious
solution ... is to bifurcate the proceeding, abiding strictly by the rules of evidence
until and unless there is a conviction, but once guilt has been determined opening
the record to the further information that is relevant to sentence." See also United
States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 914 (2d Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Thompson
v. Price, 258 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1958) (dictum), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 992 (1956).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, s961), for a discussion
of the objectives of such a sentencing system.
OCAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1 (Supp. 1967) provides, in part:
The guilt or innocence of every person charged with an offense for which
the penalty is in the alternative death or imprisonment for life shall first
be determined, without a finding as to penalty. If such person has been
found guilty ... there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue
of penalty, and the trier of fact shall fix the penalty. Evidence may be
presented at the further proceedings on the issue of penalty, of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and
history, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.
Accord, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-10 (Supp. 1966); N. Y. REV. PEN. LAw § 125.30
(1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963); TEX. CODE CRm1. PROC. art. 37.07
(1966).
7The Code provides:
[I]t [the court] shall conduct a separate proceeding to determine whether
the defendant should be sentenced for a felony of the first degree or
sentenced to death ... in the proceeding, evidence may be presented as
to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but
not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
character, background, history, [and] mental and physical condition ....
Any such evidence which the Court deems to have probative force may be
received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
8VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-291 (1960).
"158 S.E.2d at 730.
CASE COMMENTS
against self-incrimination and testify before the issue of guilt had
been determined.
Although it rejected the defendant's argument on the ground
that there was no authority to support it, the court intimated that
it favored such a procedure.'o The court, noting the language of
Frady v. United States," which held that a two-stage procedure is
most desirable even if the Constitution is not thought to require it,
indicated that such an innovation should be initiated by the legis-
lature.
Despite the fact that the Virginia court found no satisfactory
authority for the defendant's argument, there is persuasive authority
for such a proposition. In general, it is well established that a penalty
may not be imposed for the exercise of a constitutional right. In United
States v. Curry,'2 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, ruling
on an almost identical argument,' 3 stated:
Since the unitary trial poses these fundamental problems, [the
possible denial of due process] we do not interpret the silence of
Congress on this question as precluding the trial judge from
confining the first presentation to the jury to the issue of
guilt when the defendant's right to a fair trial would be jeop-
ardized by a unitary trial.' 4
The theory underlying both Frady and Curry, as well as the de-
fendant's argument in the principal case, is that the unitary trial
penalizes the defendant for invoking his privilege not to testify, and
thereby denies him due process of law. Whether the unitary procedure
is a penalty could depend upon two factors: (1) the scope of the
definition accorded the word "penalty"; (2) the practical degree of
hardship the defendant must bear for invoking his fifth amendment
privilege.
Until recently, the fifth amendment guarantee was confined to the
federal courts and to the historic types of compulsions which originally
gave rise to the privilege. However, in 1964 the Supreme Court of
"Id. at 73o-31.
u348 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
909 (1965).
2358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966).
"-The defendant argued that the unitary procedure compelled him to take
the stand and present matters relevant to his sentence before the issue of his guilt
had been determined. 358 F.2d at 913.
14358 F.2d at 914. However, Curry's conviction was affirmed because the court
concluded that, on the particular facts before it, the defendant's right had not
been prejudiced. See also United States ex rel. Thompson v. Price, 258 F.2d 918
(3 d Cir. 1958) cert. denied 358 U.S. 992 (ig58); State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244,
227 A.2d 276 (1967).
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the United States in Malloy v. Hogana5 overruled an entire line of
decisions16 and extended the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to state criminal proceedings through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The result of Malloy and subse-
quent decisions has been to cast doubt upon the criminal procedure
of the several states and on the ultimate bounds of the fifth amend-
ment privilege. 17
In the past three years, the Supreme Court of the United States
has considered two cases that deal with the meaning of "penalty"
with respect to the fifth amendment privilege and its application to
the states. In Griffin v. California, s the Court held unconstitutional
a provision of the California Constitution 9 which permitted the
court and counsel to comment on the failure of the defendant to take
the stand in his own behalf. The Court noted that the effect of such
comment was to allow the state to use the silence of the accused as
additional evidence of his guilt, thereby penalizing the accused for
invoking a constitutional privilege.2 0 The significance of the decision
is best explained by the dissenting opinion. The dissent argued that
the fifth amendment privilege had only been applied to those harsh
types of compulsions, such as incarceration or banishment, which
historically gave rise to the privilege and noted the comment rule did
not fall within such category of abuses.21 Thus, the Griffin majority
significantly broadened the area to which the definition of penalty
applies.
Then in Spevack v. Klein,22 an attorney appealed his disbarment
for invoking the fifth amendment privilege upon refusing to testify
'378 U.S. 1 (1964).
1 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (19o8).
"See Dionisopoulos, New Dimensions to the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion: The Supreme Court and the Fifth Amendment, 44 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1
(1967); Hofstadter & Levittan, Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion-Too little and Too Much, 39 N.Y.S.B. J. 105 (1967); Wendel, Compulsory
Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Developments
and New Confusion, 1o ST. Louis L. REV. 327 (1966); 53 CALIF. L. RV. 6ti (1965);
78 HARV. L. REV. 223 (1964).
"380 U.S. 6o9 (1965).
"CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13. The relevant provision reads:
[I]n any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure
to explain or deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case
against him may be commented on by the court and by the counsel, and
may be considered by the court or by the jury.
'380 U.S. at 613.
"Id. at 620-21.
"385 U.S. 511 (1967).
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or produce records at a judicial inquiry. The Supreme Court, mindful
of its decision in Griffin, further extended the definition of penalty:2 3
"In this context [fifth amendment privilege] 'penalty' is not restricted
to fine or imprisonment. It means.., the imposition of any sanction
which makes the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege 'costly'.
24
Moreover, "[t]he threat of disbarment and loss of professional stand-
ing.., are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish
the privilege [against self-incrimination]." 2 5 If loss of economic or
professional standing is a powerful form of compulsion, a fortiori,
the risk of the death penalty rather than a prison sentence assumed
by the defendant who invokes his right not to testify, is a powerful
form of compulsion and therefore a penalty within the meaning of
Griffin and Spevack.
The practical degree of hardship faced by the accused in a
capital case when he invokes his privilege against self-incrimination
is very great because the death sentence is left to the discretion of
the jury.20 When the defendant does take the witness stand it is
generally agreed that evidence in mitigation of punishment may be
introduced.27 Thus, evidence of environment, 28 motive,29 mental
defect,30 provocation,31 age of the defendant,32 and intoxication 33
'Spevack expressly overruled Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), a case
identical to Spevack, which had allowed New York to construe her own privilege
against self-incrimination and to exclude from it judicial inquiries.
'385 U.S. at 515.
2Id. at 516.
4See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, l1 U. OF PA.
L. REv. lO99, 11oo (1953), for a discussion of the statutes of 35 states which provide
that the jury shall determine whether the death sentence should be imposed.
-'United States v. Minieri, 303 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1962); Miller v. State, 40
Ala. App. 533, 119 So. 2d 197 (1959); Wright v. State, 93 Ga. App. 542, 92 S.E.2d
229 (1956); People v. Lindstrom, 9 Ill. App. 2d 570, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1961). See
also 5 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2212 (12th ed. 1957).
28State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 91o ('94'); State v. Mount, 3o NJ. 195,
152 A.2d 343 (1959); Commonwealth v. Mount, 416 Pa. 343, 205 A.2d 924 (1965).
"Ray v. State, 253 Ala. 329, 45 So. 2d 4 (1g5o); People v. Wooten, 162 Cal.
App. 2d 8o4, 328 P.2d 1040 (1958); State v. Hoffer, 238 Iowa 820, 28 N.W.2d 475
(1947); Ivey v. State, 21o Tenn. 422, 360 S.W.2d 1 (1962).
"People v. Williams, 200 Cal. App. 2d 838, 19 Cal. Rptr. 743 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962); State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 285 (1964); Swartz v. State, 118
Neb. 591, 225 N.W. 766 (1929); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 389 Pa. 382, 133 A.2d
207 (1957); State v. Collins, 5o Wash. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957).
"'Hill v. State, 27 Ala. App. 55, 166 So. 6o (1936); People v. Brust, 47 Cal.
App. 2d 776, 306 P.2d 480 (1957); Rountree v. State, 113 Fla. 443, 152 So. 20
(1934); Ward v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 278, 257 S.W. 536 (1924).
"Ridge v. State, 28 Okla. Crim. 150, 229 P. 649 (1924).
23State v. Hudson, 85 Ariz. 77, 331 P.2d 1O92 (1958); People v. Strader, 23 Ill.
2d 13, 177 N.E.2d 12!6 (ig6i); State v. Trantino, 44 NJ. 358, 2o9 A.2d 117 (1965);
State v. French, 171 Ohio St. 501, 172 N.E.2d 613 (1961).
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has been admitted in mitigation of sentence. If the accused does
not take the witness stand, the jury is deprived of information which
would be highly relevant in deciding whether to impose the death
sentence.3 4 Therefore, as a practical matter, the accused may be
compelled to take the witness stand, in which case he is deemed to
have waived his privilege against self-incrimination and is thereby
subjected to cross-examination and impeachment to the same extent
as any other witness.
35
When the accused does not take the witness stand, the closing
argument is the only opportunity for the jury to hear information
relevant to the sentence; it is generally agreed that counsel may
argue the issue of punishment. 3 While this gives the prosecution an
opportunity to ask for the death sentence, it places the counsel for
the defense in a particularly unfavorable position. The defense at-
torney must first argue that the defendant is not guilty, and then
argue even if he is guilty, capital punishment should not be imposed.37
To avoid this anomoly, a defense attorney must often ignore the issue
of capital punishment-a course of conduct made necessary by the
unitary procedure.
Even if the framework of the unitary trial were modified to permit
the defendant to testify solely on matters relevant to the assessment
of sentence,38 the practical consequence of such a change would still
'Where the accused does not take the witness stand, the prosecution may still
introduce certain evidence detrimental to the defendant. Evidence of the de-
fendant's prior misconduct is admissible if it is relevant for some purpose other
than merely showing that the defendant is the sort of person likely to commit
the charged crime. Montgomery v. United States, 203 F.2d 887 (sth Cir. 1953);
United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 233 (12th ed. 1955).
See also Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 426, 437 (1964); Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial, 70 YALE L.J. 763
(1g61).
'Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958); Brown v. State, 243 Ala. 529,
10 So. 2d 855 (1942); Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 299 Ky. 721, 187 S.W.2d 259
(1945); People v. Dupounce, 133 Mich. 1, 94 N.W. 388 (193o); People v. Shapiro,
308 N.Y. 453, 126 N.E.2d 559 (1955).
4Burgunder v. State, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256 (1940); House v. State, 192
Ark. 476, 92 S.W.2d 868 (1936); People v. Goodwin, 9 Cal. 2d 711, 72 P.2d 551
(1937); Biggers v. State, 171 Ga. 596, 156 S.E. 2O (1930); Howell v. State, 102
Ohio St. 411, 131 N.E. 7o6 (1921); Commonwealth v. Brown, 307 Pa. 515, 164 A.
726 (1933); State v. Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 90 P.2d 1026 (1939).
'While this problem is alleviated by the two-stage trial procedure, there are
several undesirable effects of the two-stage procedure. See Note, The California
Penalty Trial, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 386 (1964), for a discussion of the undesirable
effects of the two-stage trial in cases where the defendant pleads insanity as a
defense.
'There is no constitutional requirement that the defendant in a criminal
case be allowed to testify on the issue of punishment. However, a sentence will
